# ORIGINAL

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24



## BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

RECEIVED

2009 OCT -8 P 1: 23

ALL CORP COMMISSION

DOCKET CONTROL

2 MIKE GLEASON CHAIRMAN

WILLIAM A. MUNDELL

COMMISSIONER

JEFF HATCH-MILLER

COMMISSIONER

KRISTIN K. MAYES COMMISSIONER

**GARY PIERCE** 

COMMISSIONER

Docket No. E-01345A-08-0172

Arizona Corporation Commission DOCKETED

Cc. - 5 2606

DOC'MIEN OF M

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE FAIR VALUE OF THE UTILITY PROPERTY OF THE COMPANY FOR RATEMAKING PURPOSES, TO FIX Α JUST AND REASONABLE RATE OF RETURN THEREON, **APPROVE** TO RATE SCHEDULES DESIGNED TO DEVELOP SUCH RETURN.

## **RUCO'S REPLY BRIEF**

The Residential Utility Consumer Office ("RUCO") hereby submits its Reply Brief in the above captioned matter. RUCO recommends that the Arizona Corporation Commission ("Commission") deny Arizona Public Service Company's ("APS" or "Company") Motion for Approval of Interim Rate and Preliminary Order. However, the judge and the Commissioners that will weigh the Recommended Order need to look carefully at the recent unprecedented financial market activity contemporaneous with the hearing and filings in this matter for further guidance.

## THE COMMISSION SHOULD NOT USE ITS BROAD POWERS TO EXPAND THE EXCEPTION TO THE FAIR VALUE REQUIREMENT

The Company argues that under Arizona law the Commission does not need to make a finding that an emergency exists to approve interim rates. Company Brief at 5. The Company believes that the law allows the Commission to use its broad powers to expand the otherwise

-1-

1 very limited exceptions to the fair value requirement to allow rate relief depending on the 2 3 4 5 6

7 8

10

9

11

12 13

14

15

16

18

19

17

20 21

22

23

24

particular circumstances of the case. Company Brief at 5. RUCO respectfully disagrees with the Company's interpretation of the current state of the law. Perhaps the only valid generalization on this subject at the present time is there remains disagreement on the legal requirement of an emergency finding. The oft-quoted Attorney General Opinion on this issue, from which the courts and most parties in this case have cited, is conflicted. On the one hand, the Opinion provides:

> "Only if the Commission finds that an emergency exists may it approve general changes in the rates of a public service corporation without first establishing, in an appropriate proceeding, the fair value of the corporation's property." 71-17 Op. Atty. Gen. at 11 (1971).

The Opinion also provides:

"In addition, under the *Mountain States Telephone* case, supra, the inability of the Commission to grant permanent rate relief within a reasonable time would be grounds for granting interim relief." 71-17 Op. Atty. Gen. at 13 (1971).

Seven years after the Attorney General Opinion was published the Arizona Court of Appeals relied on the Attorney General's Opinion in Scates v. Arizona Corporation Commission, 118 Ariz. 531, 578 P. 2d 612 (App. 1978) ("Scates"). The Court said that interim rates should only be used in "limited situations where an emergency exists, where a bond is posted guaranteeing a refund to the utility's subscribers if any payments are made in excess of the rates eventually determined by the Commission, and where a final determination of just and reasonable rates is to be made by the Commission after it values a utility's property." Scates, 118 Ariz. at 535. The Scates Court left no doubt that interim rates could only be permitted where an emergency exists.

In 1989, the Court of Appeals revisited the issue in *Pueblo del Sol Water Company v.* Arizona Corporation Commission, 160 Ariz. 285, 772 P.2d 1138 (1989). The circumstances in Pueblo del Sol involved the transfer of assets from one water company to another. The joint applicants sought approval of interim rates in the transfer proceeding subject to refund. The Court of Appeals upheld the interim rates noting, among other things:

"Interim rates are not limited to emergency situations as appellant contends." Id., 160 Ariz. 287, 772 P.2d 1140, relying on Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 Ariz. 404, 228 P.2d 749 (1951).

More recently, in 2001, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue in *Residential Utility Consumer Office v. Arizona Corporation Commission*, 199 Ariz. 588, 591 ¶11, 20 P.3d 1169, 1172 (App. 2001). In *Residential Utility Consumer Office*, however, the Court concluded:

"Clearly, Scates contemplated, and we agree, that interim rate making requires all three elements – an emergency situation, the posting of a bond, and a subsequent full rate case-in order to comport with the constitutional mandate that rates be just and reasonable." Id., at 592, ¶17, 20 P.3d at 1173.

The Court of Appeals further distinguished *Pueblo del Sol* concluding that the *Pueblo del Sol* Court "... misstated the test set forth in *Scates:*"

"We do not believe the *Pueblo del Sol* to be an "interim rate" case as contemplated by *Scates*, The Commission's approval on *Pueblo del Sol* was, in effect, an approval of the continued use of a previously authorized rate." Id. ¶16.

Not surprisingly, the Company favors *Mountain States* and *Pueblo del Sol* for its legal conclusion that an emergency finding is not necessary for approval of interim relief. Company Brief at 5-9. A fair and honest reading of these cases in their totality more persuasively supports the legal conclusion that a finding of an emergency is necessary in order to approve interim rates.

#### AN EMERGENCY DOES NOT EXIST IN THIS CASE

The Company urges the Commission to use its broad ratemaking powers to fashion appropriate interim relief under the circumstances of this case. Company Brief at 5. However,

1 | it | 2 | b | 3 | Ir | 4 | r | 5 | C | 7 | 1 | 8 | F |

it is a stretch to assert that the case law in Arizona suggests that the Commission should broadly construe a very limited exception to the state's Constitutional fair value requirement. In fact, the Commission argued that *Scates* be applied liberally and that its power to set interim rates was not limited to emergency situations in *Residential Utility Consumer Office*. The Court of Appeals concluded a restrictive interpretation was required. *Residential Utility Consumer Office v. Arizona Corporation Commission*, 199 Ariz. 588, 592 ¶16-¶18, 20 P.3d 1169, 1173 (App. 2001). The Commission should not make the same mistake it did in *Residential Utility Consumer Office* and apply a liberal interpretation of *Scates*.

Nor should the Commission use its broad ratemaking powers to expand the definition of an emergency to fit the Company's current circumstances. Once again the Attorney General's Opinion is instructive;

"The foregoing authorities make it clear that, in general, courts and regulatory bodies utilize interim rates as an emergency measure when sudden change brings hardship to a company, when the company is insolvent, or when the condition of the company is such that its ability to maintain service pending a formal rate determination is in serious doubt." 71-17 Op. Atty. Gen. at 13.

The Company admits that a denial of interim rates will not result in bankruptcy, place the Company in receivership, or even affect the Company's ability to pay dividends. Transcript at 150. The Company seeks a far more liberal construction of "emergency" than the Attorney General's definition. The Company argues the Commission's ratemaking authority is broad enough to cover the dire financial situation the Company currently faces. Company Brief at 10. Among the factors to be considered, the Company claims the Commission should consider its prior earnings, financing difficulties, and threats of a rating downgrade. Id. The Attorney General's Opinion is dispositive on those considerations in general:

"Perhaps the only valid generalization on this subject is that interim relief is not proper merely because a company's rate of return has, over a period of time, deteriorated to the point that it is unreasonably low. In other words, interim rate relief should not be made available to enable a public service corporation to ignore its obligations to be aware of its earning position at all times and to make timely application for rate relief, thus preserving its ability to render adequate service to pay a reasonable return to its investors." 71-17 Op. Atty. Gen. at 13.

It is worth repeating that the Company's request for the specific amount of \$115 million is not supported by the record and is arbitrary. The Commission should only consider facts that are tangible and not be persuaded by verbal representations. At the very least, such hearsay should be supported by an abundance of evidence in the record to make up for its unreliability. The evidence in this record equally supports the opposite conclusion – a downgrade is not imminent. See RUCO Brief at 3-8, and Staff Brief at 6-35. Moreover, even the Company admits that the amount of money that it will need to recover on an interim basis to satisfy the credit agencies is unknown. Company Brief at 21. The Company leaves open the possibility that the Commission could approve the interim request of \$115 million and the Company's credit rating would still be downgraded.

The Company claims that the \$115 million figure is convenient and will minimize the impact on ratepayers since ratepayers were paying a nearly identical interim PSA charge until August. Company Brief at 27. This argument is also not persuasive. It actually is disrespectful to the Company's customers. It is never right for ratepayers to overpay. It certainly is not right for ratepayers to overpay in order to keep rates consistent. If ratepayers are entitled to a reduction, ratepayers should get a reduction. The same holds true if rates should increase. The notion that customer's will be confused by rate fluctuations should be rejected.

In truth, the Company's entire case is thin. The Company explains its need for interim rates based on verbal representations from a third party that have not been authenticated, corroborated or even verified in any legal manner. The Company admits that the amount of

money it will take to satisfy the credit agencies is unknown and speculative. The evidentiary concern is even more troubling given the amount of money the Company seeks. The Commission should weigh the evidence presented in the entire record and reject the Company's request for interim rates.

## CONCLUSION

Based on Arizona case law, precedent, and the tried-and-true procedural traditions of the Arizona Corporation Commission, the Commission should deny the Company's request for interim relief. However, the great uncertainty occasioned by recent market turmoil should give the decision-makers in this matter pause, and the judge and Commissioners would do well to take their time to allow a reasonable perspective of recent market events to inform the ultimate decision in this matter.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of October, 2008

Daniel W. Pozefsky
Chief Counsel

AN ORIGINAL AND THIRTEEN COPIES of the foregoing filed this 8<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2008 with:

Docket Control Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007

COPIES of the foregoing hand delivered/ mailed this 8<sup>th</sup> day of October,2008 to: 1 2 Lyn Farmer Michael M. Grant 3 Chief Administrative Law Judge Gallagher & Kennedy, P.A. 2575 East Camelback Road **Hearing Division Arizona Corporation Commission** 4 Phoenix, Arizona 85016-9225 1200 West Washington 5 Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Lawrence V. Robertson, Jr. Theodore Roberts 6 Janice Alward, Chief Counsel Attorneys At Law P. O. Box 1448 **Legal Division** 7 **Arizona Corporation Commission** Tubac. AZ 85646 1200 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007 8 Michael L. Kurtz, Esq. Boehm, Kurtz & Lowry 9 Ernest Johnson, Director 36 East Seventh Street, Suite 1510 **Utilities Division** Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 10 **Arizona Corporation Commission** 1200 West Washington Corporate Energy Manager (G09) The Kroger Co. Phoenix, Arizona 85007 11 1014 Vine Street 12 Timothy M. Hogan Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Arizona Center for Law in the 13 Public Interest Scott Canty, General Counsel 202 E. McDowell Road, Suite 153 The Hopi Tribe P. O. Box 123 Phoenix, AZ 85004 14 Kykotsmovi, AZ 86039 15 Jeff Schlegel **SWEEP Arizona Representative** C. Webb Crockett 1167 W. Samalayuca Dr. 16 Patrick J. Black Tucson, AZ 85704-3224 Fennemore Craig, P.C. 17 3003 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2600 Phoenix, AZ 85012-2913 **David Berry** Western Resource Advocates 18 P. O. Box 1064 Kevin Higgins 19 Scottsdale, AZ 85252-1064 Energy Strategies, LLC Parkside Towers 20 Jay I. Moyes, Esq. 215 South State Street, Suite 200 Karen E. Nally, Esq. Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Moyes Sellers & Sims 21 1850 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1100 Gary Yaquinto, President 22 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Arizona Investment Council 2100 N. Central Avenue, Suite 210 23 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Jeffrey J. Woner K.R. Saline & Assoc., PLC 24 160 N. Pasadena, Suite 101

Mesa, AZ 85201

1	Thomas L. Mumaw
2	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation  Law Department
3	P. O. Box 53999 Mail Station 8695 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999
4	
5	Barbara Klemstine Zachary Fryer Susan Casady
6	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation P.O. Box 53999
7	Mail Station 9708 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999
8	
9	Robert Metli Snell & Wilmer One Arizona Center
10	400 East Van Buren Street Phoenix, Arizona 85004-2202
11	
12	Michael A. Curtis William P. Sullivan Larry K. Udall
13	Curtis, Goodwin, Sullivan, Udall & Schwab, P.L.C.
14	501 East Thomas Road Phoenix, Arizona 85012-3205
15	
16	Cynthia Zwick 1940 E. Luke Avenue Phoenix, AZ 85016
17	1 1100111X, 7 12 000 10
18	9 . 1,
19	By <u>Smestine Samble</u> Ernestine Gamble
20	Secretary to Daniel Pozefsky
21	
22	
23	
24	